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The Political and Defensive Development
of the European Community: An
Examination of the Changing Role Played
by the Member States.
For nearly forty years, the member states of the European
Community1 have pursued the intent of its founders who were "de-
termined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among peo-
ples of Europe."2 World War II had served as an instrument of pol-
icy to solve the differences between the states of Western Europe by
creating a body of law applicable to their citizens and to themselves.'
Six nations originally created the European Community because
they perceived it as a means of obtaining a substantial degree of
unification.4 Although progress has been plagued by the reluctance
of the member states to surrender their claims of ultimate sover-
eignty,' the EC has played a key role in facilitating economic coop-
eration and coordination.
The present members of the European Community are seeking
to create through negotiations a single European market in which
national boundaries would be no greater an impediment to economic
activity than state borders in the United States.' No longer preoccu-
pied with expansion, the EC has shifted to a period of consolidation.,
1. The European Community refers collectively to the Economic European Community,
the Community or simply the EEC or EC.
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. I 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome or the Treaty]. The EC is technically comprised of
three separate communities. In 1951, six nations - the Federal Republic of Germany,
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands - founded the European Coal and
Steel Community. See Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18,
1951, preamble, 261 UNTS. 143 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. Six years later, the Treaty of
Rome and the European Atomic Energy Community. See Treaty Establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 98 UNTS. 169 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty].
3. STANLEY HENIG. POWER AND DECISION IN EUROPE 11 (1980).
4. Id. at 8. The EC has expanded to include twelve Member States. Besides the original
six, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined in 1972, see O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
2) 16 (1973); Greece acceded in 1979, see O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 22 (1979); and Spain
and Portugal joined in 1985, see O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 28, art. 13 (1987).
5. IAN.BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 252-53 (1966). In gen-
eral, sovereignty characterizes powers and privileges resting on customary law and independent
of the particular consent of another state. Sovereignty is often a term used to describe both the
legal personality of a state and the incidents of that personality. Id.
6. Robert J. McCartney, Europe Seeks an Economy of Scale; Twelve Nations Work to
Build a Real Common Market by 1992, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1989, at 1.
7. Id.
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The EC is attempting to go a step further than the Treaty of Rome
which long ago abolished tariffs and other direct trade barriers
within the EC borders. The Community now intends to abolish all
indirect or hidden obstacles that restrict commerce through the en-
actment of the Single European Act (SEA).8
The SEA amends the Treaty of Rome for the purpose of "con-
crete progress towards European unity."9 In addition to articulating
fresh objectives for the EC in economic, social and monetary poli-
cies, the SEA sets out to create a new political momentum among
the member states. The SEA has enabled Community members to
pursue cooperative political decisions through the codification of the
European Political Cooperation (EPC) into Title III of the SEA. °
Through this Cooperation, the EC is attempting to harmonize the
external policies of its member states, including a unified defense
policy."
The purpose of this Comment is to address the emerging politi-
cal and defensive role of the European Community as it continues to
advance its economic and social unity. The members of the EC have
found that nothing is permanent; time forces all circumstances to
change. These changes will be explored in light of the enactment of
the SEA to determine if the Community succeeded in eroding each
nation's individuality to bring closer the day when Europe can speak
with one voice.
I. The Institutions and Laws Establishing the European
Community
The European Community operates according to treaties signed
by the member states. 2 This Community law, where it applies, is
supreme law - the legal equivalent of a constitution. 3 Therefore,
the EC Constitution creates more than a mutual obligation between
contracting states. It represents an authority which citizens of mem-
ber states can invoke through the Court of Justice which ensures
that the Community law is observed in its interpretation and appli-
8. Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) I, art. 13 (1.987) [hereinafter
SEA].
9. Id. at tit. I, art. 1.
10. Id. at tit. Ill.
I1. ROBERT S. JORDAN AND WERNER J. FELD. EUROPE IN THE BALANCE 138 (1986).
12. HUGH ARBUTHNOTT AND GEOFFREY EDWARDS. A COMMON MAN'S GUIDE TO THE
EUROPEAN MARKET 42-43 (1979). The constitution is formed by the ECSC, the Treaty of
Rome, and The Euratom Treaty, supra note 2. These treaties have been supplemented by six
more: the Merger Treaty (1965), the Budgetary Treaty (1970), the Treaty of Accession
(1972), the European Audit Court Treaty (1975), the European Parliament Direct Elections
Act (1976), and the Single European Act (1986). Id.
13. A Community Within The Community: Prospects For Foreign Policy Integration In




cation."' The EC Constitution requires member states to remain
committed to working together to promote steady economic expan-
sion, balanced trade and fair competition, by establishing a common
market and by expanding their economic policies. 5
By 1955, this objective appeared to be obtainable in light of the
success of the treaty which established the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC).'6 This covenant provided for the development
of a single market for coal, iron, and steel to eliminate all barriers to
free competitive trading.' 7 The political leaders of the six member
states recognized that a motivation existed for the establishment of
the new European Economic Treaty (Treaty of Rome) to broaden
the European market.' 8 The ultimate goal was to establish a com-
mon market through which the six EC nations could gain sufficient
strength to compete economically with the United States and the So-
viet Union.' 9
This broadening process proved to be difficult since the Commu-
nity held only those "powers conferred upon it be the Treaty.""0 De-
spite the intent to create a true community, a contractual approach
was chosen as the means to develop a sense of common identity.2'
The inherent limits within the Treaty of Rome allowed the govern-
ment of each member state to surrender its claims to sovereignty
only as far as the benefits outweighed the cost.22 For example, a cen-
tral element of the Treaty of Rome was the provision which allowed
for the free movement of goods.23 Although the Treaty provided for
the removal of customs barriers, 24 it failed to set out specific guide-
lines to assist with the removal of internal tariffs.25 These diverse
administrative and tax barriers of the member states interfered with
the total free movement of goods throughout the Community.26
In spite of these limitations, Community law was designed to be
effectively administered by a Council, a Commission, an Assembly,
and a Court of Justice.27 These institutions are responsible for the
14. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 164, 173.
15. Id. at art. 2.
16. ' ECSC Treaty, supra note 2.
17. Id.
18. ROBERT S. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 92.
19. Id. at 94. It was felt that increased economic strength would eventually give the Six,
and later the whole of Western Europe, a political position equal to that of these two Super-
powers. Id.
20. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 4.
21. A Community Within The Community, supra note 13, at 1066.
22. Id.
23. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 9-11.
24. Id.
25. WALTER HALLSTEIN, EUROPE IN THE MAKING 25 (1972).
26. Id. See also, Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 97.
27. Treaty of Rome, supra, note 2, at art 4. See also, Articles 137-44 related to the
Assembly; Articles 145-53,the Council; Articles 154-55, the Commission; Articles 164-88, the
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development of an economic and social framework from which the
EC expanded."8 The institutions not only supervise the implementa-
tion of Community law, but also undertake the task of facilitating
agreements among the member states for its expansion.29
A. Council of Ministers
The principle decision-making power is given to the Council of
Ministers, whose members are sent at the discretion and on the in-
struction of their respective governments."0 It is the Council, there-
fore, that harmonizes and reconciles the interests of the separate
member states and those of the EC as a whole.31 However, the
Council of Ministers has no general law making power to make deci-
sions outside the boundaries set by the Treaty.32 In addition, most
decisions must be made through unanimous voting.33 These restric-
tions were designed to ensure that the larger states would not prevail
over the smaller ones and vice versa.34
B. Commission
Another protective measure can be found in the role of the
Commission. The European Commission essentially acts as the
"watchdog of the Treaty"35 by proposing and enforcing Community
legislation. 36 The Commission has the power to intervene when pro-
visions of the Treaty are broken, and if necessary, it has to report
breaches of the Treaty to the European Court of Justice.37 The
Council of Ministers may be the last word in translating the propos-
als into effective Community orders, but it is the Commission that
was designed to play a key role in'the day to day administrative
process that leads to their implementation.38
European Court of Justice.
28. S. HENIG, supra note 3, at 6.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and A Single Commission of the European
Community, April 18, 1965, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 152), art. 2 [hereinafter the Merger
Treaty]. "The Council shall consist of representatives of the member states. Each Government
shall delegate to it one of its members." Id. *
31. WALTER HALLSTEIN, supra note 25, at 63.
32. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 145.
33. Id. at art. 148-50.
34. ERIC STEIN, PETER HAY, AND MICHAEL WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 36 (3d. ed. 1976).
35. ROBERT S. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 97.
36. "To ensure proper functioning and development of the Common Market, the Com-
mission shall ensure the provisions of this Treaty and measures taken by the institutions
thereto are applied." Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 155.
37. Id. at art. 173.




Although legislative functions are fundamental to the success of
the EC, the Treaty does not disregard the need to have representa-
tives of the peoples, independent of national governments and inde-
pendent of other Community institutions. The European Assembly39
was designed to be the most supranational of the Community institu-
tions because of its composition."' The representatives are members
of the national parliaments of their member states and are selected
by these respective parliaments to serve on the Assembly. 1 Their
European delegation is thus linked with their national parliamentary
delegation. The Assembly, however, is not a legislative body and its
.powers are limited. Neither the Commission nor the Council is obli-
gated by the Treaty to adopt the Assembly's proposals.4 2
D. Court of Justice
The Court of Justice, on the other hand, has played a crucial
role in enforcing the promises embodied in the Treaty. The Court
has the power not only to directly invalidate any Community acts
that it finds violate the Treaty, but also to require member states to
fulfill their Treaty obligations.43 The Court's task is to "ensure that
in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is ob-
served."44 This is a broad power which allows the Court to found its
decisions on other law as well.45 Moreover, through a referral proce-
dure from national courts, it can indirectly invalidate national laws
that contravene superior Community law." Ultimately, the Court of
Justice requires the member states to accept the consequences of
what they agreed to under Community law. If a member state fails
to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty, the state can be "required
to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the
Court of Justice. ' 47
The Court of Justice, as well as the other EC institutions, has
continued to grow in number to accommodate nationals from new
member states. The establishment of these institutions has provided
39. O.J. COMM. EUR. (No. 1045) 20 (1962). The Assembly became known as the Euro-
pean Parliament in 1962. Id.
40. ERIC STEIN, supra note 34, at 43.
41. Id.
42. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 138.
43. Id. at art. 137.
44. Id. at art. 164.
45. ERIC STEIN, supra note 34, at 136-37.
46. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 169-88. See also, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. (1964). The Court dealt with this issue of the conflict of laws and found
that Community law took precedence as confirmed by art. 189 of the Treaty of Rome. Article
189 states that a regulation "shall be binding and directly applicable in all member states."
Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 189.
47. Id. at art. 171.
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for a procedure of consultation. The Council, Commission, Assem-
bly, and Court of Justice are required to work side by side in their
decision making process to allow for consistent application of Com-
munity law. In addition, governmental authorities must recognize
when amended provisions are needed to move the EC toward its goal
of complete unification.
II. The Single European Act: The Dynamics of the Change
In an ambitious effort to progress towards European unity48 and
to compete economically with the United States and Japan, the
twelve members of the EC developed a revolutionary program for a
single European market. 9 The inclusion of the single market goal
within the amendment to the Treaty of Rome was a logical step for
the EC to create a more dynamic economy in Western Europe.5" The
SEA committed the Community to achieving this integrated market
by the end of 1992.51 This target date, however, has passed and the
barrier-free European market has not arrived.
A single European market would ultimately be a market in
which national boundaries are no longer an impediment to economic
activity. 52 The abolishment of all physical, technical and legal barri-
ers to trade would result in a haven of free movement within the
borders of the EC. The SEA specifically mandates "the free move-
ment of goods, person, services and capital."53 It is this provision
which articulates the fresh objective taken by the EC to cooperate in
economic and monetary policies. Although the single market goals
are not complete, the real revolution of the 1992 plan is how it has
changed the way Europe works and how it approaches business.
A. Majority Voting
The most interesting changes since the SEA's 1987 implementa-
tion are the voting majorities. Majority voting in the Community has
been previously used. 54 However, the need for increased use of ma-
jority voting is a current development. Under a new, complicated
voting formula,55 opposition from at least two large members, plus
one or two small ones, is now needed to block a bill. As a result, a
48. SEA, supra note 8, at tit. I, art. 1.
49. Robert J. McCartney, supra note 6.
50. Coopers & Lybrand, EC Institutions and the Decision Making Process,
EUROSCOPE, Sept. 19, 1991, at 8. The Single European Act was entered into by the EC mem-
bers on July 1, 1987. Id.
51. SEA, supra note 8, at tit. II, art. 13.
52. Robert J. McCartney, supra note 6.
53. SEA, supra note 8, at art. 13.





single nation can no longer veto an action. 5 EC officials believe that
without this change, the achievement of the 1992 program would be
delayed even further. 57
However, the change in majority voting is limited to those mat-
ters which are not considered to be fundamental. The changes
mainly concern the completion of the internal market while unanim-
ity has been preserved for provisions applying "to fiscal matters, to
the free movement of person and to the rights and interest of em-
ployed persons."' 58 The retention of unanimous voting in these areas
indicates that EC members are not prepared to allow for a signifi-
cant loss of power.59 Each member state also maintains the power to
exercise a political veto when important issues are at stake.60 Never-
theless, the greater use of majority voting could ultimately weaken
each member state's veto power in the Council. The Council is the
only governmental institution in which an EC member can exercise
real control over Community legislation.61
In some respects, the power loss may be greater than the mem-
ber states expected. The SEA has given the European Parliament,
formerly known as the Assembly, legitimate say in the legislative
process.6 2 The European Parliament is now allowed to propose
amendments, or to reject the common position initially communi-
cated to it by the Council.6 3 The Council must then act unanimously
to implement its decisions.64 This new cooperation of the European
Parliament in the Community's legislative process appears to shift
the balance of responsibility from member states to the Parliament
itself. The voting power of the member states in the Council 5 is now
weakened not only by the greater use of majority voting, but also by
Parliament's increased ability to take an active role in the decision
making process. 66
56. SEA, supra note 8, at art. 6-7.
57. In Years to Come, One European Currency Might Become Feasible and Even At-
tractive, TIMES (London), June 27, 1991, § 3 (Features), at 4 [hereinafter In Years to Come].
58. SEA, supra note 8, at art. 18.
59. Nevertheless, the provisions allowing majority voting are not unimportant. They con-
cern the alteration or suspension of duties, the right of establishment, restrictions on the right
to provide services, the movement of capital, sea and air transport, research and technological
development, the health and safety of workers, and certain decisions on the environment. See
generally SEA, supra note 8.
60. H.L. Select Committee on the Eur. Comm., Supplement 4/72, at 62.
61. ROBERT S. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 98. As discussed in an the above paragraphs,
the Council of Minsters is the Community's legislative body and is responsible for taking deci-
sions on Commission proposals. This institution is the only place the member states can exer-
cise real control over Community legislation. Id.
62. SEA, supra note 8, at 6.
63. Id.
64. Id. at art. 7.
65. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 148. This provisions sets out the number of
votes available to each member state when required to act by a qualified majority. Id.
66. H.L. Select Committee on the Eur. Comm., 14th Report, 226, 1984-85 (1988). De-
Winter 1993]
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B. Free 'Movement of Goods
In addition to the use of the majority voting and the increased
responsibility of the European Parliament, the SEA has re-orien-
tated the legislative process toward the process of mutual recogni-
tion.67 The Council may now decide "that provisions in force in a
one member state must be recognized as equivalent to those applied
by another member state." 68 This provision has made a positive con-
tribution to the passage of the EC's legislative program and will
open the way to competitive lawmaking in the Community member
states.6 9 It appears that barriers to the single market will be disman-
tled as pressure is exerted on all member states to conform to the
regulatory climate which businesses view as the most advanta-
geous. 70 However, the impact of this mutual recognition continues to
be unknown.
One possible outcome is a frontier free Europe.71 The lifting of
frontier controls on goods and people was perhaps the most symbolic
goal of the single market program. 72 These goals were to be achieved
by 1992. However, it has become obvious to at least one, probably
three, and possibly all twelve member states that they will not
achieve the second of these objectives before the end of 1993. 73
Member states appear to have met the deadline for lifting frontier
controls on goods. The border posts which once existed to enforce
product standards and regulations are no longer needed. 74 The fron-
tier-controlled value added tax (VAT) and excise system were abol-
ished prior to January 1, 1993. 71 As a result, border posts cannot be
used to isolate each EC nation's indirect tax system which formerly
prevented the free movement of goods.7 6
spite the greater use of majority voting in the Council, every member state will continue to
have a political veto in practice on matters where very import issues are at stake.
67. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 1132, PROJECT 1992:
THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE, 1 (1989) [hereinafter PROJECT 1992].
68. SEA, supra note 8, at art. 9.
69. PROJECT 1992, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. In Years To Come, supra note 57. The goal of a Europe without frontier controls
was important because frontier posts added an estimated 5% to 10% to the cost of traded
goods. PROJECT 1992, supra note 67, at 2.
72. Andrew Hill, Survey of the European Single Market, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1993, at
II.
73. Id.
74. PROJECT 1992, supra note 67, at 2.
75. Europe 1993: What It's Taken To Get This Far, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1993, at 2
[hereinafter Europe 1993]. Value-added tax is the tax incurred at each step of manufacturing
process and calculated as a percentage of the increase in the value of the product due to the






Despite a few lingering doubts, the free movement of goods
seems more or less assured." The abolition of passport controls,
however, presents several problems which are unlikely to be resolved
before the end of 1993, if at all. Major disputes over immigration
checks at internal EC borders may defeat the realization of a com-
mon EC immigration policy.78 The goal under the SEA was that EC
nationals would not need checks at internal -borders because tighter
restrictions would be imposed at external borders.79 A more stringent
use of common visa and asylum policies would prevent unwanted
asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants from gaining entry into the
EC.80
Although the EC governments approved the abolition of border
checks in principle, some governments are resisting it.81 Airports
have already won a deferral of the deadline for lifting controls, on
the grounds that they could not physically change their infrastruc-
ture before December 1993 in order to separate EC and non-EC ar-
rivals.82 Regarding internal border checks, the Community is divided
in three main factions.
Britain has always been the member state most vehemently op-
posed to lifting border checks.8" Because of its geographical location,
Britain is skeptical that it will not be able to keep out terrorists, drug
smugglers and other criminals without some form of immigration
checks.84 The SEA does not oblige Britain to lift its controls on non-
EC citizens. Consequently, Britain believes that it must maintain at
least a minimal check.85
The second faction is made up of Denmark and Ireland. Den-
mark wants to maintain border controls, but has indicated in the
past that it might be prepared to lift them if sufficient safeguards are
implemented.8" Although Ireland claims to be committed to the lift-
ing of controls, its geographical proximity to Britain makes it diffi-
77. Lingering doubts about a new frontier-free regime continue to exist and will affect
certain products. There is as yet no definitive system for monitoring the cross-border move-
ment of works of art or of "duel use" goods, which have both military and civilian applica-
tions. Andrew Hill, supra note 72.
78. Kate Holder and Rebecca Brown, Refugees From East Unsettle West, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 28, 1991, at 18.
79. Sarah Helm, Momentum Grows Toward Fortress Europe, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar.
17, 1990, at 11.
80. Id.
81. Andrew Hill, supra note 72.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Stephen Kinzer, Britain Unswayed on United Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at
15, col. 1.
85. Andrew Hill, supra note 72.
86. Id.
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cult for Ireland to loosen its controls without, at a minimum, con-
sulting Britain.87
Finally, the European Commission and the remaining nine EC
countries are committed to lifting border controls on people. These
countries are members of the Schengen Free-Travel Agreement
which disputes the British interpretation of the SEA.88 The agree-
ment is designed to phase out internal checks on people.89 However,
even these most enthusiastic countries are unlikely to lift their bor-
der controls before the middle of this year.90
Controversy over immigration pressures touched off by the con-
flict in the former Yugoslavia, as well as upheaval elsewhere in the
world, have made the Schengen nine think twice about lifting their
internal border controls as quickly as they intended.91 The Schengen
Accord does not commit them to abolish internal border checks until
external frontiers have been sufficiently strengthened. 92 In addition,
ancillary measures such as a computer link between Schengen immi-
gration authorities must be put in place.93 Neither of these prerequi-
sites have yet been achieved.
Overall, EC officials argue that the member states are trying to
arrive at a satisfactory solution for security on the one hand and free
movement on the other.94 Several EC members, however, are critical
of what they view as the lack of real commitment by the EC to facil-
itate free movement. 95 They further argue that most member states,
if not all, are violating Article 8 of the SEA mandating the free
movement of persons and advocate action through the Court of
Justice.9"
The Commission continues to gather information on the actual
situation at the borders.9" Members of the Commission believe they
are doing everything in their power to overcome the problems and
hope they are resolved this year.98 Nevertheless, the action the Com-
87. Id.
88. EP Calls on Commission to Act on Border Checks, THE REUTER EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY REPORT, Feb. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter
EP Calls on Commission].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. David Marsh, Survey of the European Single Market, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1993, at§ I.
92. Andrew Hill, supra note 72.
93. Id.
94. EP Hears Commission on Free Movement and Passport Checks, REUTER EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY REPORT, Jan. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File
[hereinafter EP Hears Commission]. The EC members are working towards getting the Dub-
lin Convention on asylum procedures, the Convention on policing the EC's external borders
and the establishment of a European Information System in place. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. EP Hears Commission, supra note 94.
98. EP Calls on Commission, supra note 88.
[Vol. 11:2
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mission will take to correct what some see as a clear breach of the
SEA remains unknown. A decision by the Commission to implement
the SEA provisions to achieve free movement could be a real test of
the credibility of the EC. Elimination of internal checks would push
each member state towards identifying themselves as citizens of Eu-
rope rather than of their individual countries. For now, a common
EC immigration policy will remain a goal for the future.
D. EC Currency
The abolition of border checks is not the only goal presently out
of the reach of the member states. With ten of the twelve EC gov-
ernments committed to removing all remaining capital control before
1992 as members of the European Monetary System (EMS), a sin-
gle EC currency and a central bank were thought to be possible.99 A
common currency and bank were viewed as logical and perhaps vital
steps to ensure that the full benefits of the 1992 project were real-
ized. Although adoption of a common currency system is not directly
required by the SEA, the SEA does declare that "the Community
shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the
internal market."10 Under Article 20 of the SEA, the Community is
also committed to "cooperate within the framework of the EMS and
in developing the European Currency Unit (ECU)." 10 1 The closer
coordination of a monetary policy seemed possible through the
steady development of the existing EMS and the expanding role of
the ECU. 2
Complete economic integration, however, was unrealistic under
the Community's timetable. The prevailing attitude of Britain to-
ward a monetary union limited the momentum behind its early reali-
zation.103 Britain was forced into assenting to the EMS earlier than
anticipated because of weak economic conditions which included an
eight year high inflation rate. 10 Although Britain has benefitted
from their EMS membership by realizing a substantial decline in the
national interest rate, it appears that this direct participation is now
being used to slow the movement towards economic integration.105
99. Steven Prokesch, Britain Will Join European System of Currency Rates Soon,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, at 1. Portugal and Greece are not included in the EC members that
have linked their currencies to one another within the European Monetary System. Id.
100. SEA, supra note 8, at art. 13.
101. SEA, supra note 8, at art. 20.
102. PROJECT 1992, supra note 67, at 1. The European Currency Unit includes the Eu-
ropean Monetary System currencies plus that of Greece and the United Kingdom.
103. A. Grice and I. Glover James, Major Threatens Veto on Federal Europe, SUNDAY
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, § (Home News).
104. Steven Prokesch, supra note 99.
105. Britain made a limited commitment to the EMS by allowing agreeing to a system
of controlled exchange rates. Id.
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Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark all
support Britain's insistence that a movement toward a single cur-
rency and central bank should come after the member states have
moved closer together in economic performance.108
A large question mark hangs over the future of the EMS. How-
ever, the heads of the twelve EC countries have agreed that the most
prosperous among them, such as Germany and France, should re-
place their national currencies with a common currency no later
than 1999.107 If this target date is met, a European central bank
would make monetary policy decisions for all countries using the
ECU.108 As a result, Europe would no longer waste more than $17
billion a year converting one EC currency to another.10 9
The member states agree that a stable currency is a desirable
aim. 110 They recognize that money is the life blood of an economic
system.' More importantly, money is a central element of a na-
tion's ability to control its own destiny. Despite these realizations,
acceptance of a monetary union cannot evolve automatically. It will
have to be built slowly as member states realize the benefits to be
gained.
While important features of a true single market are absent in
1993, sufficient progress has been made to ensure the long-term com-
pletion of the market. The SEA has provided the momentum to push
the EC towards this goal. The SEA was designed to drive the EC by
a vision of the "Community interest" as a strong and independent
motivational force' 12 rather than the limited common interests of
twelve separate national interests. Nevertheless, the EC continues to
find itself in a difficult period of transition.
In an attempt to take the next step towards economic and politi-
cal union, the member states are again in the process of amending
the Treaty of Rome. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union,
signed in 1991, is a legally separate treaty from the SEA. 3 The aim
of the Maastricht treaty is to unify key elements of Europe's
strength, including monetary, economic and political policies.11"
106. Id.
107. Joel Havemann, One Europe, The Dream of Unity, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at 1.
Britain's Parliament continues to retain the right to stay out of the currency union. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The Way Ahead, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1993, at 21.
111. Joel Havemann, supra note 107.
112. A Community Within The Community, supra note 13, at 1085.
113. Flak From Maastricht Has Already Hit, THE FIN. POST, Sept. 29, 1992, §1, at 16
[hereinafter Flak From Maastricht]. For a more thorough discussion on the ramifications of
the Maastricht Treaty see Matthew Eshelman, The Maastricht Train: Slowing Down for
Sharp Curves, I1 DICK. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming Vol. 11, No. 3).




However, the treaty requires unanimous ratification by all EC mem-
bers. 115 Denmark's refusal to ratify the treaty, and marginal success
in France, revealed unexpectedly low support across Europe for uni-
fication.11 Although the fate of Maastricht remains unknown, it ap-
pears that many obstacles remain to its ratification. It is possible the
treaty attempts to do too much too soon. Instead, the member states
must first be convinced that complete intregration is the solution to
their transitional period.
At present, the EC continues to make progress to become a
community in more than name alone. The new power of the Euro-
pean Parliament in legislation will create additional pressures on a
state in the minority to soften its stance against a-political union.,
1 7
The successful use of majority voting for completion of the internal
market may eventually be extended to other areas of policy. How-
ever, any suggestion that the creation of the SEA will result in a
European super-state is an exaggeration. Although the outcome is
far from decided, the EC will probably continue to gain the self-
confidence necessary to become an aggressive competitor in the
realm of economics and other global issues.
III. European Political Cooperation
The members states have recognized the need to pursue the
"broader and deeper community" envisioned by its founders.'" 8 Al-
though the sovereignty of each member state is highly guarded, the
advantages of policy coordination have not eluded them. However,
even as a united group, the organization of external policies is a
complex process. The formulation of such policies is not based solely
on the provisions found within the Treaty of Rome.1 They also em-
anate from the EPC, an organization motivated by the desire for
political unification.120
Provisions of the Treaty of Rome set the stage for common
commercial policies and other similar matters related to the conduct
of international trade with third states.' The association agree-
ments affiliating foreign states and the EC in various ways and giv-
115. Noel Malcolm, Heads in the Sand; The Future of a Single European Market, 44
NAT'L. REV. 3, 4 (1992).
116. Id.
117. Mark M. Nelson, Britain Softens Stance, Shows Readiness To Widen European
Parliaments Power, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1991, at 13.
118. ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, at preamble.
119. ROBERT'S. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 138.
120. Id.
121. The provisions pertain to tariff or trade agreements, trade liberalization measures,
export policy, protective measures against dumping and subsidies, import and export quotas,
and other similar matters related to the conduct of international trade. See Treaty of Rome,
supra note 2, at art. 113.
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ing these states preferential trade terms also fall under the compe-
tencies of the EC institutions. 2 However, these activities constitute
only a minor part of the foreign policy interests of the-member
governments.
By 1969 the EC agreed to expand their interests in foreign pol-
icy by experimenting in "European Political Cooperation."1 2 3 The
original intent was to create an accessible forum of high foreign min-
ister officials for the coordination of foreign policy issues outside the
EC competencies."2 4 The EPC was designed with the realization that
a certain degree of interdependence exists between the economic, po-
litical and strategic goals of the EC. 15 The ultimate goal was to
attain an economic policy objective that could be used by the EC as
a means to accomplish political and strategic policy coordination
through the EPC. 26
The experiment proved to be successful, and the EC recognized
the beneficial role played by the EPC in facilitating foreign policy
integration. For example, it was the EPC that provided the necessary
assistance in the democratization of Spain and Portugal during the
1970's by encouraging supportive declarations and diplomatic ac-
tions. 27 The EPC appeared to be the solution to a multitude of
problems associated with foreign policy formulation and
implementation.
By 1985, the Member States agreed to codify the EPC in Title
III of the SEA. 28 The intent of this amendment was to impose obli-
gations upon the member states to ensure consistency between the
Community and EPC policies.129 However, a fundamental limitation
of Title III is that the member states have no real obligation to coop-
erate. Title III is not a constitutional document of the Community.
Therefore, the Court of Justice cannot enforce its obligations."' As
a result, EC members retain their legal sovereignty with the ability
to pursue their own agendas.
The member states have agreed to a limited obligation "to in-
122. "Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an international
organization agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations,
common action and special procedures." Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 238.
123. Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Politi-
cal Unification, BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. II) 9, 10 (1970).
124. ROBERT S. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 141.
125. Id. at 138.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 144.
128. SEA, supra note 8, at tit. III.
129. "The external policies of the European Community and the policies agreed to in
European Political Cooperation must be consistent. The Presidency and the Commission, each
within its own sphere of competency, shall have special responsibility for ensuring that such
consistency is sought and maintained." Id. at tit. III, art. 30(5).
130. Id. at tit. IV, art. 31. Title III is explicitly phrased as a treaty of international law
between sovereign states while Title II refers to signatories as-"member states." Id.
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form and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general
interest" before taking unilateral action.131 This provision enables
the EPC to increase the moral and political pressure on the member
states to adhere to its terms. Moreover, the provisions of Title III are
legal obligations, not withstanding the Court's lack of enforcement
jurisdiction. 32 The mere existence of moral, political and legal obli-
gations, coupled with an ongoing practice of cooperation, has re-
sulted in a willingness to increase the force of future obligations.133
With the assistance of a team of six national officials, the member
states have reached a common line on EPC matters.134 The EPC has
been able to ingrain the habit of cooperation among the member
states as dozens of foreign policy declarations come out of the EPC
each year.135
Unfortunately, the member states tend to zero in on issues they
know they can agree on. In an effort to pursue their single European
market, they have focused primarily on their economic interests in
the wider world.136 The high priority attributed to the formulation of
common policies for the single market embodied in the 1992 pro-
gram of the SEA has resulted in slow development of cooperative
decisions on foreign and security policy.1 37 However, as the EC suc-
cessfully eliminates the barriers to the movement of goods, services,
money and people across its national boundaries, the member states
can no longer ignore the new political responsibilities thrust upon
them. 3 8
The EC must secure its own interests and security by evaluating
the astonishing political changes which have taken place in the last
five years. These changes include the collapse of the Soviet Empire,
the reunification of Germany on peaceful terms and the expressed
desire of former Soviet satellites to join the EC.13 9 Although the
member states recognize the usefulness of the EPC, it is not likely
that the EPC alone will stimulate the necessary political develop-
ment for complete policy integration.
Analysts suggest that future foreign policy issues may be better
addressed by the proposed Maastricht Treaty.140 They argue that if
131. Id. at tit. III, art. 30(2)(a).
132. A Community Within The Community, supra note 13, at 1071 n.31.
133. IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 25-6.
134. David Buchan, A Long March Towards Euroarmy, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, § i,
at 2.
135. Id.
136. Brittan Speech on Europe and Wider World, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REPORT,
Feb. 9, 1993 [hereinafter Brittan Speech].
137. Id. "The external policies of the European Community and the policies agreed in
EPC must be consistent." See SEA, supra note 8, at tit. III, art. 30(5).
138. Brittan Speech, supra note 136.
139. Id.
140. Uncivil War in the European Community, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1993, at 40.
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the Maastricht Treaty comes into force it will, in theory, allow the
EC to run a more coherent foreign policy than it does today. 4
Under the Treaty's provisions, the European Commission would gain
the right, alongside national governments, to make proposals on for-
eign policy. 42 If enacted, the Maastricht Treaty may finally give the
EC the appropriate machinery to deal with the member states in-
creasing interest in a common foreign and security policy.
IV. European Community's Defense Identity
, The rapidly changing events in Europe have posed the problem
of establishing a new defense and security framework. The question
now presented is whether the institutions that came into being dur-
ing the Cold War still have a role to play in the international arena
or whether they should be phased out.'43 Europe finds itself in a stra-
tegic limbo with no obvious defense arrangements. A new security
environment requires fundamental changes that will foster a greater
allied commitment to a common defense. " ' Europe's weak response
to the Gulf Crisis forced it to find ways to strengthen its ability to
respond to future crises.
A. Gulf Crisis
During the Gulf Crisis, the EC faced the realization that the
conditions for a new European defense initiative did not exist."15 At
the time the EC pulled out of the Gulf War, Iraqi authorities had
refused to implement the resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council." Therefore, the EC Foreign Ministers decided to abandon
the idea of a joint peace proposal, recognizing the obvious signs of
powerlessness to influence events in the Gulf."" The EC lacked both
an army and a common foreign policy to serve as an effective force
in the crisis situation. The EC, however, reaffirmed their commit-
ment to contribute actively to the settlement of other regional
problems and to establish a situation of security, stability and devel-
opment upon the resolution of the Gulf Crisis. 48
The European Community continues to search for the proper
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Political Union: Defending Europe, EUR. REP., Sept. 25, 1991, § 1, at 1.
144. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 1194, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF THE EUROPEAN LANDSCAPE OF THE 1990s, 2 (1990).
145. Political Cooperation: EEC Abandons Joint Gulf Initiatives, EUR. REP., Jan. 16,
1991, at 4.
146. Id.
147. The powerlessness of the EEC did not, however, rule out individual initiatives.
France, for example, proposed a plan for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait by holding an inter-
national conference on the problems in the Middle East. Id.
148. Confrontation in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1991, at 5.
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role to play in a new European security order. Although its present
role is growing, the EC must determine if it will ever be able to
provide the military backbone that is a necessary part of ensuring
European security. The present Yugoslavian civil war has given the
EC an opportunity to work towards making this determination.1"9
B. Yugoslavia
The Yugoslavian crisis is viewed as indicative of the problems
Europe will face in the future. The strife caused by ethnic rivalries
and economic hardship will continue to plague the growth of Euro-
pean unity.150 This fact has compelled the EC to become involved in
the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, a non-member state. 51 The inabil-
ity of the EC to play a coherent role" in the Gulf War sharpened its
will to stop the bloodshed in Yugoslavia. In addition, the warring
federation borders EC members Italy and Greece as well as candi-
date member Austria. 152 For obvious reasons, the EC wants to pre-
vent any adverse effects the war may have on these nations.
The initial objective of the EC was to use its diplomatic and
economic clout to push Yugoslavia's warring Serbs and Croats to the
negotiation table.1 53 Although military action was considered, the
EC does not have armed forces of its own to place in the position of
separating rival armies. 54 Instead, the EC threatened Serbia, Yugo-
slavia's largest republic, with economic and political sanctions if it
failed to accept the peace plan.15 Mediation efforts were unsuccess-
ful when the Yugoslav parties refused to stop fighting.' 6 As violence
continued, the EC was forced to abandon its peace efforts.
1 57
The EC became frustrated by the continued failure to halt Ser-
bian-led attacks on Crotia, and therefore, the Community urged
broad economic sanctions. The EC suspended the 1980 Trade and
Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia.15 8 In addition, the EC
placed new limits on Yugoslavian imports and stripped Yugoslavia
of trade benefits.' 59 They also convinced the United Nations Security
Council to order an oil embargo in the hope of cutting off fuel for
149. David Lawday and Nick Cumming-Bruce, Europe Writes a New Chapter for Itself
in Yugoslavia, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 12, 1991, at 24.
150. Theresa Hitchens, EC Gains Clout Through Yugoslav Peace Efforts, DEFENSE
NEWS, Sept. 9, 1991, at 3 [hereinafter EC Gains Clout].
151. David Lawday, supra note 149.
152. Id.
153. EC Gains Clout, supra note 150.
154. Europe Gives Up On Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1991, at 25.
155. Id.
156. EC Observers To Leave Dubrovnik, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at 4.
157. Id.
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the conflict.160 Nevertheless, the EC appears to be finding itself in
the same difficult position of powerlessness that suspended its efforts
in the Gulf.
Despite the outcome of this security venture, the EC will gain
new international respect as a political power through its efforts to
bring peace to Yugoslavia. 61 In addition, the EC miy be able to
better access the strengths and weaknesses of other Western institu-
tions that are restructuring (North Atlantic Treaty Organization),
undergoing revitalization (Western European Union) and evolving
(the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe)." 2 These
organizations must also address the issue of what role they should
play in the changing structure of European defense.
C. NATO Attempts to Adjust
For more than forty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) has been a successful alliance by making important
contributions to the maintenance of peace among the Western pow-
ers. However, the major question now confronting NATO is whether
the alliance, as it is currently structured, can continue to play an
effective role in meeting the vital security needs of its members.163
The future of NATO may depend on its capacity to adjust in rela-
tion to existing institutions as the EC comes closer to the realization
of a single European defense policy.
Unlike the creation of the EEC, NATO was never intended to
be, and never has been, a supranational international organization.16 4
Western Europe established NATO when confronted with a danger
that put at risk their continued existence as free nations. During the
Cold War, their mission involved a need to keep "the Soviets out, the
Americans in, and the Germans down."1 5 However, Europe soon re-
alized that the short term goals of NATO had long term effects as
160. Id. at 6. See also Wilbur G. Landrey, New Fighting Felt Far Beyond Balkans, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 1, 1993, at Al.
161. EC Gains Clout, supra note 150.
162. Hans Binnendijk, The Emerging European Security Order, 14 WASH. QUAR. 67,
76 (1991). The United States is also confronted by these basic choices as the EC continues to
strength its ability to respond to future crisis and as other European States remain politically
and economically fragile during their transition from communism. Id.
163. JAMES R. GOLDEN, DANIEL J. KAUFMAN, ASA A. CLARK, AND DAVID H. PETRAEUS,
NATO AT FORTY 3 (1989). NATO's durability may be traced to three major sources: agree-
ment on the nature of the threats to the fundamental interest of the Alliance members; the
evolution of a collective response to those threats that meets the political, economic, and mili-
tary requirements of the allies; and the absence of any politically acceptable alternatives to the
current structure of the Alliance. Id.
164. ROBERT S. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 215. However, NATO's new purpose may be
to pull the East up, bring Europe together, and continue to keep the Americans in. Hans
Binnendijk, supra note 162, at 72.
165. JAMES R. GOLDEN, supra note 163, at 24. NATO represents initial efforts at cohe-
sion and collective security in Western Europe. Id.
[Vol. 11:2
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
NATO "resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for
the preservation of peace." 166
Although the goals remain the same, NATO recognizes that it
must change the means to achieve them. It appears that NATO will
become just one of a set of interlocking institutions which will con-
tribute to the new defensive role played by Europe. The EC recog-
nized, in the amendment to the Treaty of Rome, the necessity of
such cooperation by stating that "nothing . ..shall impede closer
cooperation in the field of security between certain of the High con-
tracting parties within the framework of the Western European
Union and the Atlantic Alliance." 1 7 However, the overall outlook on
security measures is limited to the provisions of the SEA which
state:
The High Contracting Parties consider that closer cooperation
on questions of European security would contribute in an essen-
tial way to development of European identity in external policy
matters. They are ready to coordinate their positions more
closely on the political and economic aspects of security. 16 8
All EC members, except Ireland, are NATO members.169
Therefore, within the Transatlantic Community, an agreement by
the members of NATO on the need for a collective European ap-
proach would represent a positive development for the Commu-
nity.17 It would allow eleven of the twelve EC members to take part
in the decision-making process concerning European security and
then exert pressure upon Ireland to conform to these policy deci-
sions. However, with the emergence of a European plan for a sepa-
rate combat force, NATO may serve as only one arm to implement
the political goals set by the EC under a common security and de-
fense policy.171 Nevertheless, the twelve EC members are not yet
ready to take on this collective responsibility for their own defense
which will allow NATO to reassess its own role in strengthening the
"European pillar" of the alliance.
NATO's greatest enemies as it seeks new missions may not be
166. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 19, 1957, 199 U.N.T.S. 67, at preamble.
Under Article 5 an attack against one member was considered an attack against them all and
required them "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Id.
167. SEA, supra note 8, at tit. III, art. 30.
168. Id. at tit. III, art. 30(6)(a).
169. Theresa Hitchens, NATO Leaders Fret Over Zeal in Yugoslavia, DEFENSE NEWS,
Sept. 23, 1991, at 4 [hereinafter NATO Leaders]. NATO also includes Norway, Canada,
Turkey, and the United States. id.
170. JAMES R. GOLDEN, supra note 163, at 310. Some legal structure, such as NATO, is
needed now more than ever to reassure Germany's neighbors (France, Poland, and ultimately,
the former Soviet Union) that their soil will never again be invaded by Germany or any other
nation. Id.
171. NATO Leaders, supra note 169. Statement by the director of the EPC
(Champenoic).
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its adversaries in the East, but rather, competing Western European
organizations.171 NATO's main enemy, .the Soviet Union, has dis-
integrated, and a new role to defend peace must be found. NATO is
therefore developing a more European character to overcome the re-
sentment by many Western Europeans against the power influence
of the United States.173 A fear has developed among United States
officials that EC members will consider other defense arrangements
to foster a greater Western European role in defense and security
matters. 174
This fear appeared legitimate as France began to press for the
creation of a security structure in Europe that excluded the United
States. 75 This pressure lead to the birth of a Franco-German corps.
The corps is meant to be the nucleus of a future European defense
and will fall under the command of the Western European Union
(WEU), the defense alliance of ten EC countries.1 76 However, under
an agreement signed by NATO's supreme military commander and
the French and German chiefs of staff, the corps will also be availa-
ble to defend NATO or for use in peace-keeping missions. 77 Since
France does not support or take part in NATO's integrated military
structure, the agreement with Euro-corps is a way of drawing France
closer to the NATO military."7
As this debate over the proper European defense identity con-
tinues, France, along with the other member states, recognizes that
the EC lacks the capability to be responsible for their own defense.
The Euro-corps is not scheduled to reach full force until 1995 and
the WEU remains weak.17 9 Throughout this transitional phase,
Western allies have agreed that NATO will retain the power to
make key decisions on the use of military force in Europe.8 0 Each
member of NATO must strike a balance between their desire for
autonomy and their obligation to the alliance. The future of NATO
depends on its capacity to respond to this intrinsic tension between
interest and duty.
Although its role is undefined, NATO remains vital to Europe's
172. Max Boot, Nato Must Define New Sense of Mission, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONI-
TOR, Jan. 19, 1993, at 8.
173. ROBERT S. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 277.
174. Id. at 279.
175. Id.
176. NATO, France. Germany Sign Euro-corps Agreement, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Jan. 21, 1993, § (News).
177. Id.
178. The easing of the original tension between France and NATO is already apparent
as France's position on NATO's role has changed to a more pragmatic view. France now
accepts that the resources NATO has must be available for other purposes outside of NATO's
geographical borders. Theresa Hitchens, NATO Retains Authority in European Military Af-
fairs, DEFENSE NEWS, Feb. 1, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter NATO Retains Authority].
179. Max Boot, supra, at 172.
180. NATO Retains Authority, supra note 178.
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* safety in a time of violent nationalism which threatens the stability
of Western Europe. 181 NATO provides a sense of security that un-
derlies the Community's prosperity and protects against re-nationali-
zation. 182 The EC believes that NATO's continued existence is nec-
essary to prevent the return of separate national armies. This
appears to be a valid concern in light of the reunification of Ger-
many which reminds the EC of the powerful military force Germany
once was and could become again.18
3
The challenge of a possible rivalry with whatever European
forces the EC creates for itself on its road to political unity has given
NATO a new lease on life. Although uncertainty remains among
NATO officials, NATO will most likely adapt to the new untested
role it must play. 1 4 At present, NATO continues to be more milita-
rily and strategically equipped to respond than the EC to defense
related problems. 8 5 The limited impact of the EC in Yugoslavia has
clearly indicated this fact.18
D. Revitalization of the Western European Union
The WEU, established in 1955, was designed as a regional or-
ganization to defend Western Europe from attack.187 In addition, it
was created to help control West German rearmament, to cooperate
with NATO in the defense of the Atlantic area, and to promote the
unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe.1 88 How-
ever, these hopes for the development of a more independent defense
effort through the WEU have had limited success.
The WEU is made up of ten members of the EC and NATO.189
In addition to the full members, Turkey, Norway, and Iceland were
recently included as associate members, and Denmark and Ireland
as observers. 190 Although devoid of any governmental features, the
181. Robert Keatley, NATO Gains New Life as Europe Faces Rising Threat of Nation-
alism, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1991, at 10. This challenge is giving NATO a new lease on life.
The leaders will craft a vastly different NATO that is more political, much smaller, less nu-
clear and with somewhat imprecise duties. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Alan Cowell, Bush Challenges Partners in NA TO over Role of United States, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1991, at 1.
185. Id.
186. Fred Tanner and Christian Tuschhoff, Only NATO Can Do the Job - or Can It?,
INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 16, 1993, § (Opinion). NATO no longer considers Yugoslavia a
problem beyond its jurisdiction. The EC has looked to NATO to enforce the no-flight zone
over Bosnia and to enforce the UN embargo of Yugoslavia. Id.
187. ROBERT S. JORDAN, supra note 11, at 53.
188. In the 1980's it also more clearly emerged as a European manifestation of NATO.
Id.
189. The WEU defense alliance broadened its ranks on November 20, 1992. Greece was
added as a full member. WEU Defence Alliance Broadens Its Ranks, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Nov. 19, 1992, § (News).
190. These countries signed on November 20, 1992. The new associate members of the
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WEU serves as an arena for intra-European military cooperation.' 10
As with NATO, Title III, Article 30 of the SEA recognizes that
nothing should impede the ability of the EC to cooperate in the field
of security with the WEU. 192 This recognition indicates that the
WEU is the most convenient and appropriate place for European
Foreign and Defense Ministers to discuss their views on the role of a
developing European defense system.19
In spite of its limitations, ,the WEU has served an important
role as an interface between the twelve members of the EC as they
become increasingly interested in defense issues. The Community,
however, remains divided on the ability of the WEU to emerge as
the key institution for European security. France, and to a lesser ex-
tent Germany, want the WEU under the direct control of the Euro-
pean Council to facilitate a mutual defense commitment among the
EC.' 9" Britain, on the other hand, has always supported the WEU as
the appropriate focus for efforts to build a greater role for Europe,
but as an arm of NATO, not as an EC pillar.1 96
These diverse positions held by EC members regarding the ef-
fectiveness of the WEU represents a lack of mutual dedication
needed to accomplish a unified security policy. A need exists to
maintain political unity which in turn may force reluctant members
of the EC down the road they most fear, that of being drawn into a
conflict in a faraway country of which it knows little.1 97 The EC's
involvement in both the Gulf Crisis and the present Yugoslavian civil
war illustrate the reality of this fear.
Without a mutual commitment to defense, the members of the
EC will undermine their "awareness of the responsibility incumbent
upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice and
to act with consistency. . . in order to more effectively protect its
WEU will be able to play a full role in the alliance's activities but will not be able to veto
decisions. Nor will they be covered by the WEU's automatic defence guarantees to help mem-
bers under attack. As observers, Denmark and Ireland will be able to attend all meetings but
cannot speak unless they are asked to do so. Id.
191. ERIC STEIN, supra 34, at 3.
192. SEA, supra note 8, at tit. III, art. 30.
193. JAMES R. GOLDEN, supra note 163, at 290, 310. It is logical to prefer the WEU
over NATO initially since a large portion of NATO's most modern forces are provided by the
United States. The support of the WEU would result in a gradual lessening of West European
dependence on the United States which is an inevitable trend. Id.
194. Political Union: Defending Europe, supra note 112.
195. Hans Binnendijk, supra note 162, at 78. Since the WEU was originally set up after
WWII to monitor German rearmament, the idea of the WEU as a defensive for the EC is
somewhat awkward for Germany. See EEC Defense Plan Gains Support, MONTHLY REP. ON
EUR., Oct. 1990, at 15.
196. Lionel Barber, Kerin Hope and John Brown, Greece Welcomed Into Revived WEU,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1992, at 2.
197. Colen Brown and Sarah Helm, Major Warns Against Intervention, THE INDEPEN-
DENT, Sept. 18, 1991, at 1.
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common interest and independence. "198 More importantly, the EC
will make a huge step backwards regarding a "closer cooperation on
questions of European security" which "contributes in an essential
way to the development of a European identity in external policy
matters."' 9
Although the precise role the WEU will play in the future re-
mains ill-defined and disputed, the member states recognize that a
logical solution exists. The problem of strategic limbo may be best
resolved by the WEU acting as a bridge between NATO and the
EC.2 00 A majority of the Community supports an arrangement
where the WEU actively represents the European side within
NATO's framework.20 ' However, this raises the issue of whether the
WEU will reinforce rather than duplicate the work done by NATO.
For the most part, the focus should be on the need to strengthen
rather than weaken the cohesion between the institutions.
The WEU as the focal point for European defense identity was
first realized when efforts were made by the WEU to coordinate Eu-
ropean naval operations in the Gulf Crisis .20  Although the WEU
aided in the enforcement of the economic embargo on Iraq through
its naval activities, it was unable to reach internal agreement on
what to do next.2 03 The reliance on the United States sea-lift, com-
mand and control, intelligence and manpower made it painfully clear
to the EC that they need to fill large military and political gaps to
become a united and equal voice in foreign and security policy.20 4
Involvement in the Yugoslavian conflict has allowed the EC to
explore its options for military intervention. Since the EC lacked
military forces to send to Yugoslavia, unarmed civilians, also called
monitors, were placed in Yugoslavia. 0 5 The WEU supported the
monitoring mission which was established to act in cooperation with
all the concerned parties to help stabilize the cease-fire by monitor-
ing the suspension of the implementation of declarations for
198. SEA, supra note 8, at preamble.
199. Id. at tit. III, art. 30 (6)(a).
200. Political Union: Defending Europe, supra note 112. See also, Hans Binnendijk,
supra note 162. Although the France and Germany collaboration envisions an absorption of
the WEU by the EC after 1996, it also supports the idea of the WEU serving as a "temporary
bridge" between NATO and the EC. Alan Cowell, NATO and European Warships Blockade
Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1992, § 1, at 3.
201. Hans Binnendijk, supra note 162, at 69. Few members of the EC support a total
fusion of the WEU into NATO to act as its European arm. Id.
202. Id. at 73.
203. The French broke ranks with a last-minute unilateral peace initiative. The Belgians
were unwilling to well artillery ammunition to the British. The Germans hesitated before hon-
oring the NATO commitment and sending Alpha jets to a threatened Turkey. Id.
204. Id.
205. Brioni Accords "'Only Way To Avoid Bloodshed," EC Warns, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, July 10, 1991, § (News).
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independence. 0 6
The EC also considered sending military troops to Yugoslavia in
place of the monitors.20 7 This proposal to send "peace-keeping"
forces presented the potential to widen differences between EC mem-
bers on the best way to handle the crisis.2 08 While France, the
Netherlands and Germany pressed for intervention in the crisis, Brit-
ain consistently emphasized the need for restrictions on further ac-
tion.20 9 Although the peace-keeping force was never accomplished,
the member states became aware of the calls for a broader defense
role for Western Europe.
As the crisis in Yugoslavia continues, the WEU has become
more focused on its role as the European pillar of NATO. 10 The
WEU assisted NATO in giving teeth to the UN embargo imposed in
early 1992.211 Five WEU warships were given approval to stop and
search ships, to divert them to other ports and to fire across their
bows if necessary. 12 However, the impact of the WEU remains lim-
ited. The WEU does not have NATO's integrated military command
and well-developed political structure.21 3 In addition, it lacks
NATO's eighteen radar surveillance planes, and its standing naval
fleets in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and English Channel. 21 '
The member states remain optimistic about the development of
the EC's independent arm. The EC has ambitions to expand as the
defense arm of a future European Union embodied in the Maastricht
Treaty.215 In anticipation of this expanded role, the WEU has added
a fifty-member military planning cell to its fifty-strong secretariat. 211
The planning cell, comprised of military officers seconded from
member states, will be charged with developing scenarios for future
operations. 217 At the start of 1993, the WEU Secretary-General
William van Ecken, pledged that "the WEU's new military planning
cell will not duplicate NATO activities. 2 18 Instead, the WEU will
have the opportunity to develop the Franco-German Eurocorps as it
206. Id.
207. EC Gains Clout, supra note 150.
208. Andrew Marshall, EC Moves Nearer Armed Action on Yugoslavia, THE INDEPEN-
DENT, Oct. 1, 1991, at 8.
209. Germany exhibits the strongest support for military intervention as it proposes
"peace-making" rather than "peace-keeping" troops. However, they are unable to do anything
without the EC support due to constitutional restrictions and their history with Yugoslavia. Id.
210. NATO Retains Authority, supra note 178.
211. Around the World, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, November 21, 1992, at A12.
212. Id.
213. NATO Retains Authority, supra note 178.
214. Id.
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strives to achieve full strength by 1995.
E. The Evolution of The CSCE
Following the end of World War II, every phase of life in Eu-
rope was affected.219 The early 1970's saw the beginning of an opti-
mistic phase of an intensified search for solutions.220 The Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)22'1 became an im-
portant part of that search. The signing of the Final Act by CSCE
members at the Helsinki Summit of 1975 clearly illustrates this
fact.222 The Final Act was an attempt to bury the past and to estab-
lish a new set of guidelines to lessen the tension and hostility be-
tween nations.22 a
In substance, the Final Act is a comprehensive code of conduct
which covers all major areas of international relations.22 The basic
concept of the Final Act is that while national sovereignty must be
respected, there should also be a gradual lowering of the barriers
that separated the East and West since the end of World War 11.22
The thirty-five participating states realized that the conflicting aims
of the parties, the complexity of the subject matter, and the individ-
ual views of each participating state on a specific topic did not allow
for any foreseeable results.22 The Final Act, therefore, appears to
serve more as a challenge, than as a conclusion to the problems fac-
ing a divided Europe.
Western European governments, which now make up the mem-
ber states of the EC, viewed the CSCE as more than a "bargaining
chip" to territorial disagreements.227 Instead, the CSCE offered a fo-
rum that could be used to obtain a post-war equilibrium in Eu-
rope.228 However, the complexity of the final document does not al-
low for this simple interpretation. In addition, the Helsinki Final Act
is not a legally binding treaty, but rather, a political document that
219. JOHN J. MARESCA, To HELSINKI - THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPER-
ATION IN EUROPE, 1973-1975 3 (1987).
220. Id.
221. Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292.
222. Id.
223. Id. The CSCE served as a substitute for a peace conference bringing World War II
to a formal conclusion. The Helsinki Final Act is probably as close to a WWII peace treaty as
we shall ever see. JOHN J. MARESCA, supra note 219, at 24.
224. STEFAN LEHNE. THE VIENNA MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON'SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE. 1986-1989 5, (1990). The document covers military matters, as
well as humanitarian concerns, aspects of economic relations as well as issues concerning infor-
mation, and education and culture. It includes concrete normative commitments, general state-
ments of intent, declaratory texts, and procedural provisions. Id.
225. Id.
226. JOHN J. MARESCA, supra note 219, at 25. The members of the CSCE that con-
cluded at Helsinki on August 1, 1975, included all the members of the EC. Id. at 249.
227. STEFAN LEHNE, supra note 224, at 2.
228. Id.
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is only binding in so far as the participating states have, both in text
as well as on the occasion of its signing, stated their determination to
fully implement its provisions.229
Although consensus has been difficult over the past fifteen years,
the CSCE laid the basis for a reasonable relationship between EC
coordination and political cooperation.2 30 Some suggest that the
CSCE created a flexible and efficient political procedure through
which the member states could maintain a united front.23 However,
the vast changes in the present European situation could render the
CSCE process obsolete.2 32 East-West conflict as the dominant Euro-
pean concern have been reduced by the political, economic and mili-
tary implications of the German reunification and the collapse of the
Soviet Empire.23 The Eastern barriers to human contacts and to the
free flow of information and ideas is rapidly falling. The political
reality is that Europe is beginning to resemble the ideal status set
out in the ten principles of the Final Act.23'
However, the CSCE agreement has remained at the center of
discussions on the political and defensive future of Europe. CSCE's
three baskets are uniquely suited to today's political, economic, and
security challenges. The baskets address questions relating to secur-
ity in Europe (Basket I); cooperation in the fields of economics, of
science and technology, and of the environment (Basket II); and co-
operation in humanitarian and other fields (Basket III).235 The vari-
ety of subject matters encompassed within this framework allows for
a comprehensive and flexible agenda that the CSCE can address.
At present, the CSCE finds itself in a difficult position with no
consensus on its future role. The collapse of the Soviet Empire left
the fifty-four members of the CSCE with an ill-defined, evolving role
in dispute settlement.23 6 In addition, those members of the EC who
believe the Community should quickly develop its own political and
military force envision a much more limited role for the CSCE
framework. 3 7 The ability of the EC to achieve this common security
structure could have a significant impact on the future fate of the
CSCE.2 8
229. The United Nations Charter, Article 102, explicitly states that the Final Act is not
eligible for registration. U.N. Charter, art. 102.
230. HUGH ARBUTHNOTr, supra note 12, at 170.
231. Id.
232. STEFAN LEHNE, supra note 224, at 189.
233. Id. See also, Brittan Speech, supra note 136.
234. Final Act, supra note 221, at Basket I.
235. Id.
236. Brittan Speech, supra note 136.
237. STEFAN LEHNE, supra note 224, at 191.
238. U.N. to Strengthen Cooperation with Regional Organizations, XINHUA GENERAL
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. In the pre-




As the Cold War is left behind, the EC continues to be con-
fronted with many age-old national, religious, and ethnic conflicts.
NATO, the WEU, and CSCE will be required to play a greater part
in deepening and broadening European unity. Although the EC is
attempting to develop its own unified defense policy, it must continue
to ensure that these organizations compliment and reinforce one an-
other while the member states develop the military backbone to
achieve their goal. The lines of communication must remain open
between NATO, the WEU, the CSCE, and the EC.
The political unification of the EC, on the other hand, may pro-
gress at a faster pace than their quest for a central security policy.
The enactment of the SEA has provided the EC with the fundamen-
tal changes needed to motivate it towards a single European market.
Although the realization of the single market fell short of the 1992
target date, the EC has made positive advancements toward the es-
tablishment of a Community free of all internal barriers in the
future.
The member states, however, remain leery of surrendering their
identity as individual sovereign nations. They continue to be reluc-
tant to allow for a central monetary system and a common immigra-
tion policy which are essential elements to EC unification. The mem-
ber states must first recognize that the achievement of a single
market opens a path to a more cohesive and competitive Europe. The
EC may have to continue slowly in a step by step process, but it
should not go on indefinitely. The governments of the member states
will have to pool more of their economic policy-making resources
than they imagined if they are to enjoy the benefits of a Europe
where goods and services, capital and labor move freely around a
truly common market.
Julie M. Pentico
standing with the CSCE. The CSCE will implement the action required to carry out the perti-
nent resolutions of the Security Council. Id.
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